Guides/Equity Research

Biotech Valuation: rNPV, Launch Curves and the Sum of the Parts

A company with no earnings is valued on what its pipeline would earn if it worked, weighted by the chance that it does. The whole skill is putting the risk in one place and not two.

By Surojit Chakraverti, founder of L3VLUP and an investor running a long-short healthcare and technology equities strategy.

On this subject: ex-Citi Industrials and Rothschild Healthcare M&A.Updated 4 November 202616 min read

A DCF asks what a business will earn. A biotech valuation first asks whether the product will exist at all. The risk-adjusted net present value, rNPV, answers that programme by programme: a DCF with two extra ideas, probability and the launch curve, both of which matter more than the discount rate. This guide works through the biotech rNPV model in the Models library, and ends with the two questions a wholly-owned pipeline does not ask: what a partnered programme is worth, and how long the cash lasts.

What you will build

  • Stage-transition probabilities, multiplied into each programme’s chance of approval
  • A launch curve from patients, penetration and price
  • Risk-adjusted cash flows that weight each year by the stage it is spent in, and the revenue by the chance of approval
  • The sum of the parts, the cash runway and the readout’s two values

Why a DCF is not enough

Diagram

Three programmes, three calendars, one place for the risk

Each programme’s calendar by stage, every year as tall as the workbook’s probability of reaching it; where the clinical risk is counted; and how long the cash lasts.

Each year as tall as the chance of getting there

Phase 1Phase 2Phase 3Filing and reviewProtected salesAfter exclusivityProgramme A · Phase 3 · PTRS 54.0%rNPV $708.0m100%54%launch Y4LOEProgramme B · Phase 2 · PTRS 18.9%rNPV −$42.4m100%18.9%launch Y7LOEProgramme C · Phase 1 · PTRS 11.3%rNPV $163.2m100%11.3%launch Y9LOEY1Y5Y10Y15Y20

The bars step down at each stage gate, by the workbook’s own probability of reaching that year’s stage. Revenue is weighted by the full probability of approval and spend by the probability of reaching the stage it is spent in: risk is applied to the cash flows once, and nowhere else.

Risk counted once

Unrisked value of the three programmes$3,958.5mLess clinical risk, applied once−$3,129.6mProgramme rNPVs$828.8mLess corporate costs, present value−$334.5mEnterprise value$494.3mPlus net cash+$280.0mEquity value$774.3m$9.68 a share

Every year is discounted at the same 12.0%. The probabilities already carry the clinical risk, so the rate does not carry it again.

Cash runway, before any financing

Net cash $280mSpent by the end of Y1$170.0mSpent by the end of Y2$341.1mSpent by the end of Y3$553.2m

Spend is counted unrisked here, because a trial is paid for whether or not it works. Net cash runs out during Y2; Programme A’s first sales are in Y4.

The biotech rNPV model’s base case, read from its Programmes, Programme A to C and SOTP sheets, discounted at 12.0%.

Read as a table
Programmes
ProgrammeStage nowLaunchLoss of exclusivityProbability of approvalUnrisked NPVrNPV
Programme APhase 3Y4Y1454.0%$1,411.0m$708.0m
Programme BPhase 2Y7Y1718.9%$319.7m−$42.4m
Programme CPhase 1Y9Y1911.3%$2,227.8m$163.2m
Stage-transition probabilities
StageProbability of passing
Phase 1 to Phase 260.0%
Phase 2 to Phase 335.0%
Phase 3 to filing60.0%
Filing to approval90.0%
From unrisked value to equity
LineValue
Unrisked value of the three programmes$3,958.5m
Less clinical risk, applied once−$3,129.6m
Programme rNPVs$828.8m
Less corporate costs, present value−$334.5m
Enterprise value$494.3m
Plus net cash$280.0m
Equity value$774.3m
Cash runway, planned spend before any revenue
YearPlanned spendCumulativeNet cash left
Y1$170.0m$170.0m$110.0m
Y2$171.1m$341.1m−$61.1m
Y3$212.1m$553.2m−$273.2m

A conventional DCF forecasts revenue with a growth rate and discounts it at a cost of capital. For a company selling a product, that is a reasonable description of the uncertainty: the business exists, the question is how fast it grows. For a company whose lead asset is in Phase 2 it is not. The revenue either arrives at something like the forecast or it never arrives, and the probability of each branch is the single most important number in the analysis.

Raising the discount rate to compensate is the common shortcut and the wrong one. A 20% rate says the cash flows are risky in every year, forever; the real risk is a binary event in year three. Once the drug is approved the risk falls sharply, and a valuation that carried the trial risk in the rate has to change its rate on the day of the readout, which tells you the rate was never the right place for it.

The rNPV puts the probability where it belongs: on the cash flows that depend on the event, and only on those.

The workbook this guide walks through

The model values a fictional company with three programmes: A in Phase 3, B in Phase 2 and C in Phase 1, each with its own sheet, over twenty annual periods. The Assumptions sheet holds the company-wide inputs (a 12% discount rate, 21% tax, 80m diluted shares, $320m of cash against $40m of debt, an assumed share price of $9.50, $35m of unallocated corporate costs growing 3% a year) and the four stage-transition probabilities: 60% from Phase 1, 35% from Phase 2, 60% from Phase 3 and 90% from filing to approval. The Programmes sheet holds everything that differs by programme, in three columns: the stage, the last year of each phase, the launch and loss-of-exclusivity years, the patients, penetration and price that build the launch curve, and the costs.

Each Programme sheet turns those inputs into a launch curve, an unrisked cash flow, a risk-adjusted cash flow and an rNPV. SOTP adds the three rNPVs, deducts the present value of corporate costs and adds net cash to reach equity value and a value per share. Readout values Programme A on Phase 3 success and on failure and reads the probability the share price implies. Checks ties it all together. The base case: Programme A is worth $708.0m, Programme B minus $42.4m, Programme C $163.2m; equity value is $774.3m, or $9.68 a share, 1.9% above the assumed price. The clinical risk adjustment, the unrisked value of the three programmes less their rNPVs, is $3,130m: four times the company’s equity value is probability.

Step 1 of 6

Probability of success, stage by stage

Every clinical stage has a published base rate of passing. The largest recent study, by BIO, Informa Pharma Intelligence and QLS Advisors (February 2021), followed 9,704 development programmes from 2011 to 2020 and found 52% passing Phase 1, 29% passing Phase 2, 58% passing Phase 3 and 91% of filings approved: a 7.9% chance of approval from Phase 1. Its 2016 predecessor, on 2006 to 2015, had put Phase 1 near 63% and Phase 2 near 31%. Variation by therapeutic area is wide: oncology passed Phase 2 25% of the time and Phase 3 48%, while haematology’s chance of approval from Phase 1 was three times the average. The workbook’s 60%, 35%, 60% and 90% sit at or above the latest averages, as illustrative assumptions for a company whose programmes are better than the typical one; an analyst using them for a real company would have to say why.

The probability that a programme reaches the market from where it stands is the product of the stages still ahead of it. The first row of each Programme sheet, Cumulative probability of approval (PTRS), does the multiplication: Programme A, in Phase 3, has two hurdles left and a PTRS of 54% (0.6 times 0.9); Programme C, in Phase 1, has four and a PTRS of 11% (0.6 times 0.35 times 0.6 times 0.9). That gap, not the discount rate, is why an early asset is worth a fraction of a late one with the same peak sales.

The base rates are the starting point, not the answer. An analyst adjusts them for the mechanism (validated or novel), the endpoint (objective or subjective), the size and design of the trial, and the quality of the data so far. The adjustment is where the analytical work is, and it should be written down beside the number. In the workbook the four probabilities are inputs on the Assumptions sheet, each one labelled as the chance of passing a single stage, which is the convention to keep: a cumulative probability typed in as an input cannot be audited.

  • Probability to market = product of the remaining stage probabilities.
  • Adjust base rates for area, mechanism, endpoint and data; state why.
  • Carry stage risk in the probability, not in the discount rate. Never in both.

Step 2 of 6

Which cash flows get weighted, and by what

The rule that separates a careful rNPV from a careless one: cash flows inside the current stage are not risk-adjusted, and everything after it is weighted by the probability of reaching the stage in which it is spent. The company is running its Phase 2 trial now and paying for it whether or not the drug works, so those costs carry a weight of one. The Phase 3 trial happens only if Phase 2 succeeds, so it carries 35%. Filing, review and the pre-launch commercial build happen only if every trial succeeds, so they carry 35% times 60%. Revenue and the cost of selling it happen only after approval, so they carry the full PTRS.

Each Programme sheet makes this visible in one row, Probability of reaching this year’s stage, which reads 1 through the current stage and steps down at each later transition, and then in two rows beneath the unrisked cash flow: Risk-adjusted development and launch costs, and Risk-adjusted commercial cash flow. Keeping them apart lets you read the expected spend on its own. Programme B, in Phase 2 until Y3 with Phase 3 in Y4 and Y5 and launch in Y7, spends $45m a year on development and $30m on its pre-launch build. Expected and discounted, that is $45m at a weight of one for three years, $45m at 35% for two, and $75m at 21% in the review year: a present value of about $143m of expected cost, against the roughly $210m the unweighted plan would show.

The mistake this prevents is subtle and common: risk-adjusting the revenue but not the later trials. A model that does that has a failed Phase 2 paying for a Phase 3 that would never have been run, which makes early programmes look worse than they are and hides the real shape of the bet. The opposite mistake, weighting the Phase 3 trial by the full probability of approval, understates the cost of a programme that gets to Phase 3 and fails there. Corporate costs are not risk-adjusted at all. They are paid whatever the pipeline does, which is why they sit outside the programmes on the SOTP sheet.

Lev writes one page in full-strength ink marked this trial, then uses an orange pot of diluted ink for the later pages marked everything after.
The trial running now is paid for in full. Later trials, launch costs and revenue happen only if it succeeds, so all carry the probability.

From the workbook

Biotech rNPV and sum-of-the-parts model, Programme B sheet

Programme B, Y1 to Y20: the unrisked cash flow, the development and launch costs and the commercial cash flow each weighted by its own probability, the discount factor and the rNPV against the unrisked NPV.

Inspect the workbook
All checks read zero100%
Every value, every sheet, as the workbook holds it.
Programme Bsheet, 8 rows of 31
ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWX
4$mUnitY1Y2Y3Y4Y5Y6Y7Y8Y9Y10Y11Y12Y13Y14Y15Y16Y17Y18Y19Y20Notes
25Unrisked cash flow$m(45.0)(45.0)(45.0)(45.0)(45.0)(75.0)46.292.4138.6184.9231.1231.1231.1231.1231.1231.157.857.857.857.8Operating profit - tax.
26Risk-adjusted development and launch costs$m(45.0)(45.0)(45.0)(15.8)(15.8)(15.8)--------------Each year at the probability of reaching the stage it is spent in.
27Risk-adjusted commercial cash flow$m------8.717.526.234.943.743.743.743.743.743.710.910.910.910.9Revenue - cost of goods - selling - tax, at the PTRS from launch.
28Risk-adjusted cash flow$m(45.0)(45.0)(45.0)(15.8)(15.8)(15.8)8.717.526.234.943.743.743.743.743.743.710.910.910.910.9
29Discount factor, mid-yearfactor0.940.840.750.670.600.540.480.430.380.340.300.270.240.220.190.170.150.140.120.11
30Present value of risk-adjusted cash flow$m(42.5)(38.0)(33.9)(10.6)(9.5)(8.4)4.27.510.011.913.311.910.69.58.47.51.71.51.31.2
31Programme rNPV$m(42.4)
32Unrisked NPV$m319.7NPV if the programme reaches the market with certainty.

Select a cell to see its row, its schedule and the type of cell. Font colours: blue for inputs, black for formulas, green for links to other sheets. Scroll sideways to see every period.

Step 3 of 6

Development spending and launch timing

Three inputs on the Programmes sheet set a programme’s calendar: the last year of each clinical phase, the launch year, and the loss-of-exclusivity year. Development cost is incurred in every year before launch; the pre-launch commercial cost falls in the year before it; the years between the end of Phase 3 and launch are filing and review, in which the company spends and earns nothing. The Checks sheet refuses a timeline that runs out of order.

Timing is the lever most analysts underrate. Programme A launches in Y4 and loses exclusivity in Y14, ten years of protected sales. Move its launch to Y12 and leave everything else alone, and its rNPV falls from $708m to minus $179m, because eight more years of development cost are incurred and only two years of protected revenue remain before the LOE year. A programme’s value is a window between launch and exclusivity loss, and a delay closes the window from one side while the patent clock closes it from the other.

Step 4 of 6

The launch curve: patients times price

A drug’s revenue is not a growth rate. It is the number of patients treated times the net price per patient, and both are built from parts that can be checked against the epidemiology and the market.

Patients: the addressable population with the indication, the share diagnosed and actually treated, and the share of those the drug captures, which ramps from launch to a peak over three to five years as prescribers adopt it and access is negotiated. Price: the gross list price, less the gross-to-net discount to payers and intermediaries, which in the US commonly runs from 20% to 50% and grows over a product’s life.

Peak sales is what falls out when penetration reaches its peak, and it is worth rebuilding from these parts every time someone quotes it; the Programme sheets carry a reconciliation row that does exactly that. Then exclusivity ends. Loss of exclusivity, when patents and regulatory protection expire, cuts revenue to a fraction within a year or two for a small molecule and more slowly for a biologic, and moving that year by two in either direction changes a programme’s value more than most other inputs. The workbook keeps a retained share of revenue after the LOE year, 20% for Programme A, rather than cutting it to nothing.

Programme A’s launch curve, from the Programmes sheet (invented figures)
LineFigureWhat it comes from
Addressable patients120,000Epidemiology for the indication
Diagnosed and treated60%Treatment rates, guidelines, access
Peak penetration30%Competitive position, label, physician surveys
Patients at peak21,600The product of the three lines above
Net price per patient a year$45,500$65,000 list less a 30% gross-to-net discount
Peak net revenue$983mPatients times net price, reached in the fourth year of sales

Milestones and royalties: valuing a partnered programme without double-counting the risk

Most biotechs do not take every programme to market alone. A licensing deal sells a partner the right to develop and sell a programme in return for an upfront payment, milestones on defined events and a royalty on sales, and the partner usually takes over the development cost from the date of the deal. The workbook models wholly-owned programmes, and the same sheets value a partnered one once three substitutions are made.

First, the development and pre-launch costs from the deal date onward move to the partner, so the licensor’s Risk-adjusted development and launch costs row falls to the current-stage costs it has already committed. Second, the commercial cash flow row is replaced by the royalty: the royalty rate times net revenue, weighted by the same PTRS as the revenue it is paid on, because a royalty on a drug that is never approved is nothing. Third, each milestone is a cash flow in the year of the event that triggers it, weighted by the probability of reaching that event and no further. A milestone paid on the start of Phase 3 carries the chance of passing Phase 2; a milestone paid on approval carries the full PTRS; the upfront carries a weight of one, because it is paid on signing.

The double-counting traps are all variations on charging for the same risk twice. Weighting a milestone by the PTRS when it is paid on an earlier event, so that an approval probability is applied to a Phase 3 payment. Discounting partnered cash flows at a higher rate because they are “risky”, when the probability has already carried the risk. Counting the partner’s share of revenue as well as the royalty. And the quiet one: leaving the licensor’s own selling costs in the model for a product the partner now sells.

An illustrative licence of Programme B, after its Phase 2 readout (expected values before discounting)
PaymentAmountPaid whenWeightExpected value
Upfront$50mOn signing100%$50m
Milestone$100mPhase 3 begins (Phase 2 passed)35%$35m
Milestone$150mApproval35% × 60% × 90% = 18.9%$28m
Royalty15% of net revenueEach year of sales18.9%, the same as the revenueRate × net revenue × 18.9%, year by year
Development cost after the dealPartner’sRemoved from the licensorn/aNil

Step 5 of 6

Cash runway and the equity bridge

The sum of the parts reaches equity value by adding net cash and deducting the present value of corporate costs, and the workbook does it in that order on the SOTP sheet: $320m of cash less $40m of debt is $280m of net cash, or $3.50 a share. What it does not do, and says it does not do on the cover, is model any future financing. That is the right choice for a valuation and the wrong one to leave unexamined, because a development-stage biotech almost always needs more money before its lead asset earns any.

Runway is read off the Programme sheets and the Assumptions. In Y1 the three programmes spend $60m, $45m and $30m on development and the company a further $35m on corporate costs: $170m against $280m of net cash, which is less than two years. Programme A launches in Y4. The company will raise money, and whoever buys the shares today will own less of the pipeline than the diluted share count suggests. An analyst states the runway beside the valuation, estimates the raise and its price, and either dilutes the per-share value or says plainly that the figure is before financing. The model’s answer, $9.68, is the second kind.

The rest of the bridge is the ordinary one: diluted shares including the options and warrants a biotech always carries, net cash rather than gross, and corporate costs deducted as a present value rather than ignored. Read the SOTP sheet for which programme carries the value. Programme A alone, at $708m, is worth more than the company’s whole enterprise value of $494m, because the corporate costs, a present value of about $335m, come off the top and Programme B is worth less than nothing: the company is a single trial with a pipeline attached, and should be sized as one.

The readout: two values and one price

Programme A reads out at the end of Phase 3. The Readout sheet values the company in both outcomes. On success, only approval is left to earn, the filing and pre-launch costs become certain, and the shares are worth $16.47. On failure, Programme A is worth the costs already committed and the company spending as planned would be worth less than nothing; the sheet floors the failure value at the $3.50 of net cash a share, on the assumption that a company that has lost its lead asset returns its cash or cuts its spending rather than carrying on.

The assumed $9.50 share price sits between the two, and the sheet reads the probability it implies: 46%, against the 60% the model assumes for Phase 3. That gap is the whole investment argument in one row. Lower the Phase 3 probability to 50% on the Assumptions sheet and the value per share falls to $7.23, Programme A to $572m, and the implied probability moves to 49%: the market is now pricing the trial almost exactly as the model does. The probability-weighted average of the success value and the failure value before the floor (minus $0.51 a share) equals the base-case value per share, and the Checks sheet holds it there, which is the proof that the risk has been counted once. The floor is a judgement about what management would do, so it enters the implied probability but not that check.

Step 6 of 6

From programme to company: the sum of the parts

Each programme’s risk-adjusted cash flows are discounted and summed to its rNPV. The company is the sum of those rNPVs, less the present value of the corporate costs that every programme has to pay for, plus the cash on the balance sheet and less any debt. Divide by the diluted share count and set it against the price.

Read the sum for two things. Which programme carries the value: if the lead asset is 90% of the enterprise value, the company is a single trial with a pipeline attached. And how much of the value is probability: the unrisked NPV of the programmes less their rNPV, which the SOTP sheet reports as the clinical risk adjustment. For a company with early assets that gap is most of the value, which is why one readout can move the share price by more than any change to any other input.

The 12% is a cost of equity. A development-stage company is financed almost entirely by shares, so its cost of capital and its cost of equity are close to the same number, and the rate is set as one would set any cost of equity: the market risk of the shares, not the chance that a trial fails, which the probabilities already carry. The workbook uses 12% as an illustrative cost of equity for a development-stage company, not as a convention. Published industry averages sit lower: Aswath Damodaran’s January 2026 US industry data put the average cost of equity of 496 biotechnology companies at 9.01% (a beta of 1.14) and their cost of capital at 8.49%, an average weighted towards large profitable companies. A small company whose value rests on a few programmes carries more market risk than that average, which is the case for a rate above it, but how far above is a judgement and no published source fixes it. That is why the sensitivity below matters more than the point.

One discount rate for the whole company is the cleaner convention, because the stage risk is already in the probability. Analysts who use a higher rate for earlier programmes are counting the same risk twice; if you do it, say so and show the sensitivity. The SOTP sheet carries a discount rate sensitivity across five rates: at 14% rather than 12% the shares are worth $7.93, a smaller move than a five-point change in the Phase 3 probability, which is the point.

Caveat

Where biotech models go wrong

Read

Gross price used as net, which overstates revenue by the whole gross-to-net margin. Exclusivity loss ignored or placed late, which can double a programme. Revenue grown at a rate rather than built from patients and price, so nobody can check it against the epidemiology. Later-stage costs left unweighted, so failed trials pay for trials that never happen. Corporate costs left out of the sum, so the company is worth more than its parts. Basic shares instead of diluted. Runway never mentioned, so the per-share value assumes a financing that has not happened at a price nobody has set.

And the one that matters most in an interview: a probability quoted as the next stage’s chance of success rather than the chance of reaching the market. A Phase 2 asset does not have a 35% chance of being a drug; it has a 35% chance of reaching Phase 3, and something under 20% of being approved.

Next

Build the model, programme by programme.

The biotech rNPV model in the Models library is the workbook on this page: three programmes at three stages, a launch curve from patients and price, stage-gated probabilities, the readout and the sum of the parts, every figure a live formula.

What the download contains. The worked biotech rNPV and sum-of-the-parts model is an Excel file: 9 sheets (Cover, Assumptions, Programmes, Programme A, Programme B, Programme C, SOTP, Readout, Checks), 1,423 live formulas and every check reading zero, so a changed input moves the whole model. The starter workbook is the same file with the launch curve left blank for you to build.

Every starter workbook downloads with a free L3VLUP account. A worked model downloads with L3VLUP Plus (one each billing month, kept for good) or L3VLUP Pro (every model).

Build the biotech rNPV and sum-of-the-parts model yourself

A free account downloads the starter workbook: the same model with the schedules this guide describes left blank, to fill in and check against the worked version online. One email, no password.

Frequently asked questions

What is rNPV in biotech valuation?

The net present value of a drug programme’s cash flows after each year’s flow has been weighted by the probability that the programme reaches that point. Cash flows inside the current clinical stage carry a weight of one, because the money is being spent regardless; everything after it, later trials, the launch and the revenue, carries the probability of getting there. Programmes are valued one at a time and summed.

How do you calculate the probability of success for a drug?

Multiply the probabilities of passing each remaining stage. Base rates by phase are published (the 2011 to 2020 industry study found about 52% for Phase 1, 29% for Phase 2, 58% for Phase 3 and 91% for approval, varying widely by therapeutic area), then adjusted for the mechanism, the endpoint, the trial design and the data so far. A Phase 2 asset therefore has a probability of reaching the market of roughly 15% to 20% (15% on the study’s averages, 19% on the workbook’s), not the chance of passing its current trial.

How are milestones and royalties valued in an rNPV?

Each milestone is a cash flow in the year of the event that triggers it, weighted by the probability of reaching that event and nothing more: a payment on the start of Phase 3 carries the chance of passing Phase 2, a payment on approval carries the full probability of approval, and an upfront carries a weight of one. A royalty is the rate times net revenue, weighted exactly as the revenue is. The development cost the partner takes over leaves the licensor’s model from the deal date. Nothing is then discounted at a higher rate for being risky, because the probability has already carried the risk.

What is a launch curve?

The path of a drug’s revenue from launch to peak and on to loss of exclusivity, built from patients times price: the addressable population, the share diagnosed and treated, a penetration that ramps to its peak over several years, and a net price after the gross-to-net discount. Peak sales falls out of those inputs; the year exclusivity ends decides how long they last.

Why not just use a higher discount rate for a risky biotech?

Because the risk is a binary event in a specific year, not a constant drag on every cash flow forever. A high rate misstates both the timing and the size of the risk, and it has to change on the day of the readout, which shows it was never the right place for it. The rNPV carries the trial risk in the probability and leaves the discount rate to do the job it does everywhere else.

What does the biotech rNPV workbook download contain?

The worked model as an Excel file: the cover, Assumptions, Programmes, a sheet for each of the three programmes, SOTP, Readout and Checks, every formula live. The starter workbook is the same file with the launch curve cleared on each programme sheet (launch flag, uptake, patients treated, net price, exclusivity factor and net revenue) for you to rebuild from the Programmes inputs. Any free account downloads the starter; the worked file follows the terms shown under the preview.

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